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Abstract
We study the length of agreements in a market in which infinitely-lived firms
contract with agents that live for two periods. Firms diﬀer in the expected values
of their projects, as do workers in their abilities to manage projects. Worker ef-
fort is not contractible and worker ability is revealed during the relationship. The
market dictates the trade-oﬀ between sorting and incentives. Short- and long-term
contracts often coexist: The best firms always use short-term contracts to hire high-
ability senior workers, firms with less profitable projects use short-term contracts to
save on the cost of hiring junior workers, whereas intermediate firms use long-term
agreements to provide better incentives to their workers. We relate our results to
the optimal assignment literature that follows Becker (1973).
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1 Introduction
A key element of a contract is its duration. Some firms sign a long-term agreement with a
worker for several years. Other firms sign contracts period by period, either with the same
worker or with diﬀerent workers over time. In this paper, we analyse the firms’ choice
of short-term or long-term contracts in a market where heterogeneous firms compete for
heterogeneous workers who are subject to moral hazard.1
In our dynamic model, firms hire workers to run their projects. Firms are infinitely
lived and diﬀer with respect to the profitability of their projects. Workers live for two
periods, starting as junior agents in the labour market. In any period, each firm requires
two workers: a junior agent (with no specific skills) and a senior, experienced worker,
whose expertise is crucial for the advancement of the project. All the participants are risk
neutral and have the capacity to commit to long-term contracts.2 Workers are protected
by limited liability, and a moral hazard problem is present because the contract cannot
specify the senior’s eﬀort when running a project.
When young, all workers are indistinguishable in ability. Working for a firm as a
junior has a training component: workers acquire the knowledge and experience required
to run projects as seniors. We assume that this training provides industry-specific human
capital, which allows any worker hired by a firm as a junior to run a project as a senior
for any firm in the market. Whereas the competence level needed to run a project as a
1As the contributions by Dam and Pérez-Castrillo (2006), Serfes (2008), and Alonso-Paulí and Pérez-
Castrillo (2012) show, when the analysis is enlarged to include market interactions, the shape of optimal
contracts may diﬀer substantially from the agreements obtained for a given relationship studied in iso-
lation. When heterogeneous principals compete for heterogeneous agents, the identity of the partners in
each relationship (in addition to the contract signed) is endogenous, as are the levels of utility obtained
by the agents.
2When it is diﬃcult to ensure commitment from agents, contracts may include, for example, non-
compete clauses under which the agent agrees not to pursue a similar profession or trade with a firm in
the same industry if he breaks the contract. Contracts may also include other clauses that reduce the
worker’s mobility by increasing the cost of the worker being hired by another firm. If no participant can
commit to a long-term contract, then all contracts must be short-term. If the participants on one side of
the market (say, the firms) can commit but the others cannot, then there can still be room for long-term
contracts, but they are typically less eﬃcient than in an environment with full commitment. In terms
of the commitment possibilities, we place ourselves in the best scenario for the prevalence of long-term
contracts.
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senior is unknown to all market participants ex-ante, it is revealed during the training
period: after the agent has worked for a firm as a junior, all firms and the worker himself
discover whether he has high or low ability as a senior. In other words, we model a
very simple training technology that combines two dimensions of learning. First, the
innate ability of the worker is revealed through his training as a junior worker, with this
information becoming common knowledge for the industry. Second, there is a learning-
by-doing component: working as a junior is a prerequisite for subsequently running a
project as a senior.
We characterise the equilibrium of this model. Our equilibrium concept is close to the
idea of “stability” used in the matching literature that analyses contracts in environments
where matching between firms and workers is endogenous.3 To be at equilibrium, an
outcome (that is, a matching and a set of contracts) must be immune to deviations by
participants.
We first show that firms signing long-term contracts in equilibrium oﬀer a young agent
an agreement in every period that includes a low salary for the first period together with
the promise of a higher reward when he becomes senior. This practice allows firms to
alleviate the incentive problem they face with senior agents, improving the eﬃciency of
the relationship, and their profits. Firms that sign short-term contracts hire a junior agent
every period with no promise of a future position. They also sign short-term contracts
every period with a senior worker (who may or may not be the same worker they hired
as a junior in the previous period); the terms of the agreement will depend on the senior
worker’s value in the market (which may depend on the worker’s ability level).
Second, we show that the market equilibrium depends on the characteristics of the
set of firms considered. When all firms in the market have very profitable projects, all of
them sign long-term contracts in equilibrium. Each firm oﬀers the same contract that it
would oﬀer in an agency problem (no market) situation.4
3Stability and competitive equilibrium are very closely related concepts. Any stable outcome is also
a competitive equilibrium and vice-versa. For (early) matching models in which the parties decide on
money instead of contracts, see the original contribution by Shapley and Shubik (1972) and the excellent
literature review by Roth and Sotomayor (1990).
4In an isolated long-term relationship between a firm (principal) and a worker (agent), if both are
able to commit to the duration of the contract, the solution to the repeated moral hazard problem is to
oﬀer a long-term contract (see, e.g., Lambert, 1983, Rogerson, 1985, Malcomson and Spinnewyn, 1988,
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More interestingly, when heterogeneity in the population of firms is suﬃciently large,
some firms sign short-term contracts with their junior workers and recruit in the market
for senior workers. These firms specialise in a particular type of senior: firms with the most
profitable projects hire high-ability senior agents, whereas those with the least profitable
ventures employ low-ability senior workers.
The firms with highly profitable projects obtain large profits by hiring high-ability
senior agents and are willing to oﬀer high wages in the market to attract them to run
their projects. As a result, the expected utility of junior workers, when they accept short-
term contracts, is high because, if they turn out to be of high ability, they will obtain
a reward in the market as seniors. This prospective reward leads workers to accept low
wages as juniors. Firms with relatively poor projects take advantage of this willingness
of junior workers to accept low wages during the training period. For these firms, the
savings they achieve on juniors’ wages is more important than the losses they incur from
hiring low-ability seniors. Therefore, in these equilibria, the firms with the most profitable
projects use short-term contracts to obtain the services of high-ability workers, whereas
the firms with the least profitable projects use short-term contracts to economise on the
costs of junior workers. In this sense, the matching between firms and senior agents is
positive assortative for the set of firms that use short-term contracts. Finally, for firms
with intermediate projects, the trade-oﬀ between the advantages of long- and short-term
contracts is often resolved in favour of long-term contracts.
The results and intuitions of our model can be applied to industries where talent
(agents’ ability) can be publicly assessed and is not firm-specific. These industries are
also analysed by Terviö (2009), who finds that under short-term contracts, firms rely too
much on the pool of incumbent workers, that there is market failure in the discovery of
talent, and that wages for known talents are too high. Our focus is not on the discovery of
talent but on the market assignment of workers to firms, in particular through the choice
of contract length.5
The arts and sports are examples of markets in which the abilities of senior workers
and Chiappori et al., 1994).
5As Terviö (2009) observes, in his model, “inexperienced individuals would pay for the chance to
discover their talent”. In our model, junior workers implicitely pay to discover their talent by accepting
a short-term low-wage contract. This reduction in the wage has implications not only for the workers
and the firms that are ready to pay for talent but also for other firms that benefit from the low salary.
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are widely known, as they are subject to public scrutiny through the performance of these
workers, and the human capital involved is mainly industry specific. In these markets,
the length of the agreement between companies or clubs and agents is as important as the
level of compensation. Moreover, some long-term contracts include clauses that prevent
or make it diﬃcult to break them. Actors, singers or soccer players, for instance, may sign
exclusive contracts (with a studio, a record company or a club) for a long period during
which they cannot perform, record or play for another firm.6 However, there are also
companies that oﬀer shorter contracts, particularly to young singers or soccer players.
The stars of these markets (relatively few individuals) attain prominence and success,
and earnings are significantly greater than those of ordinary workers. The same can be
said for surgeons or creatives in the advertising industry. Finally, the market for upper-
level executives, or top scientists and engineers, also shares some similar features: these
executives are well-known within their industry, and their contracts may (or may not)
include special clauses that function as commitment devices intended to prevent them
from moving to other firms.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper to study how the choice of contract
length may be determined by market interactions. The paper is complementary to the
contribution of Ghosh and Waldman (2010), who compare two contractual arrangements:
up-or-stay vs. up-or-out contracts in a setting where multiple firms compete for one
worker. Their paper does not address the issue of endogenous matching, as it studies
firms’ attempts, through Bertrand competition in wages, to attract the single worker
available in the market. They show that up-or-out prevails when firm-specific human
capital is low and high- and low-level jobs are similar. Otherwise, standard (up-or-stay)
practices are optimal. Similarly to our paper, Ghatak et al. (2001) study an overlapping
6Some actors and cast members have had very restrictive contracts. For example, George Reeves’
(Superman in the 1950s) contract prevented him from taking other work that might interfere with the
series by including a “30-day clause”, which meant that the producers could demand his exclusive services
for a new season on four weeks’ notice. Similarly, publishers such as comic producers, may retain the
creator of the comic book character by retaining copyrights associated with this character and the stories.
These companies own the copyrights to the artist’s entire professional portfolio and have exclusivity over
representations of characters created by the artist. After leaving a publishing firm, an artist is typically
required to create from scratch. Finally, managers, scientists, and engineers can be prohibited from
working for a competitor, on the ground that they would inevitably disclose trade secrets (for an analysis
of some consequences of the “doctrine of inevitable disclosure” see, for example, Png and Samila, 2013).
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generations version of a principal-agent problem in which contracts are determined in
general equilibrium. In their model, all young workers are identical but, depending on
their performance, will have diﬀerent investment possibilities as seniors. Ghatak et al.
(2001) do not allow for long-term contracts because their aim is to explain seniors’ choices
between becoming entrepreneurs or remaining workers.
Our paper is also related to the optimal assignment literature that follows Becker
(1973), who presents a theory of marriage and shows that positive assortative matching
arises when abilities (or any other characteristics) are productive complements. Anderson
and Smith (2010) develop a dynamic model of the labour market where only nature knows
the workers’ and firms’ types. However, there is learning in this model because agents
can update their beliefs about each of the matched partners through observation of a
joint public signal. In their model, productive complementarity no longer implies positive
assortative matching. There is a conflict between productive and dynamic eﬃciency: less
output today may lead to a more profitable measure over types tomorrow. Informational
concerns dominate productive concerns for agents whose “reputation” (that is, their pub-
licly observed odds of being high productivity types) is neither too high nor too low.
Eeckhout and Weng (2010) follow this line of research and study a diﬀerent set-up where
firms’ characteristics are publicly known. In their framework, where there is a one-sided
inference problem, positive assortative matching always arises under productive comple-
mentarity. Moreover, in the previous two papers, the competitive equilibrium implements
the planner’s stationary solution that maximises the aggregate flow of output.7
We assume a production function where the value of a firm’s project and workers’
abilities are complements. Supermodularity is maintained after incorporation into the
model of moral hazard, which implies that utility is not perfectly transferable between
firms and workers. Therefore, the existence of positive sorting in short-term contracts
follows from the characteristics of the production function and Becker’s result. The new,
interesting, conflict that appears in our model occurs between the benefits of sorting, which
require the flexibility associated with short-term contracts, and the superior incentives
provided by long-term contracts, which preclude sorting. That is, positive assortative
matching does not occur for all the participants because it requires giving up the gains
associated with long-term partnerships. Finally, the nature of this trade-oﬀ implies that
7Both papers study supermodular as well as submodular production functions.
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the competitive equilibrium does not necessarily lead to the socially eﬃcient solution. In
terms of total surplus, the market leads to overuse of long-term contracts.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Sections 3, 4 and 5 analyse the candidates for long- and short-term contracts in equilib-
rium. Section 6 characterises the identity of the firms and workers that enter into the
relationship, the equilibrium salaries, and the contracts that emerge as a result of market
interactions. Section 7 discusses some implications of the model when the set of firms is
endogenous. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 Model
We model the economy as an overlapping generation model where at each period , with
 = 1 2 , firms contract with workers to develop projects. Firms are infinitely-lived
players, and the set of firms is constant for all periods. On the other hand, workers
(agents) live for two periods. Both firms and workers discount the future according to the
discount factor , where  ∈ (0 1).
All participants are assumed to be risk neutral. We also assume that a worker, at
any age, enjoys limited liability over income. We normalise the minimum wage to zero.
Therefore, we assume that the wage in any period and contingency cannot be negative.
At any period , each firm is endowed with a project. The revenue for the firm from
the project is  + , if it is developed successfully, and   0 if it is not developed
successfully (i.e., is a failure).  can be interpreted as a fixed component of the revenue
that is not subject to uncertainty. The additional value of the project in case of success,
, is public information; it is the same across periods for a given firm but varies across
firms. It is distributed in the interval
£¤, with   0, according to the distribution
function (). Hence, the set of firms can also be identified as the interval £¤.8 We
8In our model, all firms have the same  while they are heterogeneous with respect to  so that a
“good” firm is a firm with a high . However, workers have no influence over  and decisions do not
depend on  . Therefore, our analysis is independent of whether  is the same for all the firms or varies
from one firm to another. We can assume an arbitrary function  () that associates a fixed revenue  to
each variable revenue  with all our basic results unchanched in this more general scenario. It could be
the case, for example, that  () is decreasing and that firms with a high  have lower expected profits
than firms with a low .
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assume that the set of active firms
£¤ and the distribution function () are given;
we will discuss these assumptions in Section 7
In each period, a generation of workers is born. We assume that the measure of the
set of workers born in any period is larger than the measure of the set of firms. Therefore,
in period  the market is composed of the set of firms, the set of workers that enter the
market during this period and the set of older workers that entered the market in period
− 1. In period 1 there is a set of workers who are already old.
To run its project, a firm must hire a non-trained worker and a trained worker. Any
agent is a non-trained worker during the first period that he works in this market. After
this first job, a young agent who has worked for a firm becomes a trained worker; that is,
working for a firm gives the agent the necessary skills to take charge of a project.9 We will
also refer to non-trained and trained workers as junior and senior agents, respectively.10
According to our assumptions, there are more junior workers than non-trained positions
to fill in the market.
A senior agent enters a relationship only if his expected utility is at least equal to
some “outside utility” that we denote by  . That is,  is the level of utility that an
agent can secure outside the economy, in any period, and can be understood as his utility
outside the labour market. Similarly, a junior agent accepts a contract only if his expected
intertemporal utility is at least  +  .
All workers are indistinguishable when junior. However, when senior, agents may have
diﬀerent abilities. An agent’s ability to run a project as a senior is ex-ante unknown to
all players, including the agent himself. There is public learning of the ability once the
agent has worked for any firm, that is, when he is senior.
A junior agent working for a firm performs a routine job and exerts a predetermined
9In our model, workers can develop their potential to run projects as seniors independently of the type
of firm with which they are employed. If only the firms with the most profitable projects would allow the
junior workers to eventually develop their abilities, then movements of workers from low- to high-profit
firms would not occur and short-term contracts would lose their advantage.
10Those agents who did not work for any firm when young could also be hired as non-trained workers
when old. In other words, the time spent working as a junior is both probational and formative. However,
we will assume that they are no longer in the market. As will become clear once we develop our analysis,
this is just a simplification, as no firm would prefer to hire an old-non-trained worker rather than a junior
one.
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and contractible level of eﬀort.11 We normalise the cost for the agent of exerting this eﬀort
to zero. If we denote by  the payment to the junior agent, then his utility at this age
is  .
A senior agent working for a firm runs the project and his eﬀort level (or his decision)
is crucial to its success. This specialised eﬀort is not contractible (not verifiable), and
it influences the probability of success of the project. We assume that the probability
of success is , where  is the senior agent’s eﬀort and the parameter  summarises his
ability.12 The ability  can take two values:  or  with   ; that is, for the same
eﬀort   0, a high-ability senior agent has a higher probability of success () than a
low-ability senior agent (). As noted above, it is only after being employed as a junior
worker that an agent’s (industry-specific) ability is public knowledge.13 Ex-ante, there is
a proportion  of high-ability agents in the population.
The result of the project (success or failure) is verifiable; hence, the agents’ payment
can depend on it. Given that the junior agent’s eﬀort is verifiable, there is no reason to
oﬀer him a contingent payment, and a fixed salary  ≥ 0 is optimal. On the other hand,
a contingent payment scheme should be oﬀered to the senior agent to incentivise his work
eﬀort. We denote the incentive contract by  = (∆), where the first component,
 ≥ 0 is the base payment, i.e., the transfer in case of failure, whereas the second part,
∆ is the bonus in case revenue  is obtained. The contract oﬀered may vary, depending
on the (publicly known) ability of the senior worker, that is, we may have  diﬀerent
from  Given the contract (∆), the expected utility of a senior agent of ability 
is
 + ∆ − 1
2
2
where 1
2
2 represents the cost of supplying eﬀort . Under contract (∆), the senior
agent selects the eﬀort that maximises his expected utility, i.e.,
 = argmax
 { + b∆ − 12b2}.
11The assumption that the junior agent’s eﬀort is contractible enables a simple set-up. The main
conclusions of our analysis carry over to a more complex model where the junior agent’s eﬀort is subject
to moral hazard, provided the worker’s eﬀort does not aﬀect the learning of his ability.
12We assume that the parameters of the model ensure that  is always smaller than 1.
13If there were some firm-specific human capital, workers who change jobs in the second period of their
lives would lose their firm-specific formation.
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Therefore, the level of eﬀort is
 = ∆.
The previous equation represents the Incentive Compatibility Constraint () of a senior
agent. The agent tends to exert a higher level of eﬀort, the larger is his bonus (∆), and
the higher are his skills ().
In any period , the expected profits of an active firm that runs its project with a
junior agent, to whom it pays the salary  , and a senior agent of ability , who is paid
according to the payment scheme (∆), are
 −  + (−∆)− 
Firms and workers in this market can sign either Short-term (ST) or Long-term (LT)
contracts. A ST contract between a firm and a junior agent consists of a salary  . A
ST contract between a firm and a senior agent is an incentive scheme (∆) that may
diﬀer for agents with diﬀerent abilities (and can also depend on the value of the project
in the case of success). A senior agent had worked for some firm in period  − 1 but
not necessarily for the same firm with which he signs the ST contract at period . A LT
contract between a firm and a junior agent in period  specifies the salary that the worker
will receive during the first period of the relationship and the incentive scheme that will
govern the relationship in period  + 1. The incentive scheme can be a function of the
revealed ability of the agent. That is, a LT contract is a vector (   ∆  ∆) that
implies a commitment by the firm to retain the worker as a senior and a commitment by
the agent to work for the same firm in period + 1, independently of his ability.
In each period, each firm determines the contracts it oﬀers and the type of workers it
hires. Therefore, anOutcome in the economy specifies, for each period , the assignment of
(some) junior and senior workers to firms and the contracts that govern their relationship.
Recall that a contract between a firm and a junior agent in period  is signed in this period
and can be either ST or LT. On the other hand, the contract governing the relationship
between a senior worker and a firm in period  can be either a ST contract signed in this
period or a LT contract signed in period − 1.
In any period , the contracts signed involve, on the one hand, all firms and the junior
workers, that may chose either a ST or LT contract and, on the other hand, firms and the
senior workers who signed ST contracts in period  − 1. We seek equilibrium outcomes,
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that is, outcomes that are immune to deviations in any period . First, contracts must
be individually rational for the agents and the firms. Any (junior or senior) worker who
signs a contract in period  must be better oﬀ under the proposed outcome than if he
did not enter the relationship. Additionally, firms must obtain non-negative profits. For
simplicity, we assume that all firms in
£¤ are active in the market, that is, we assume
that the firms’ participation constraint holds.14 Second, a firm and any worker that sign a
contract in period  cannot be better oﬀ by signing a diﬀerent contract than the one that
obtains in the equilibrium outcome. This implies that any equilibrium contract that a
firm-worker pair signs at  cannot be improved. In addition, a firm and a (junior or senior)
worker that are not matched at , under the proposed equilibrium, cannot be made better
oﬀ by signing a contract among themselves. Therefore, an equilibrium outcome is immune
to deviations by any firm and any worker: the firm has no incentive to deviate from the
proposed outcome by changing the contract with its assigned workers or by contracting
with other agents. Note that a firm can keep or attract a worker in period  if it oﬀers
him a contract under which he obtains the same level of utility (or a slightly higher level
of utility) than his current level.
Hence, Equilibrium in the economy is an outcome where:
) all active workers obtain at least their outside utility (i.e., junior workers achieve an
expected total utility of at least (1 + ) , and senior workers obtain an expected utility
of at least  , if they sign a contract at their respective ages);
) no firm would obtain higher expected intertemporal profits by changing the set of
proposed contracts to another set of contracts that guarantee to each worker at least the
same level of expected utility as is obtained under the current outcome.
We focus the analysis on stationary equilibria, that is, on equilibria where firms follow
the same strategy every period.15 For simplicity, we refer to stationary equilibria simply
as equilibria.
In equilibrium, a firm may oﬀer
• LT contracts to junior workers (that it retains them as seniors, whatever their type),
14We return to this issue in Section 7.
15Our model is stationary. In particular, firms do not face any liquidity constraint, so their decision in
a certain period does not depend on the success or failure of the previous period’s project. Otherwise, a
firm might fluctuate between hiring a young agent through a LT or ST contract, depending on the past
history of profits.
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or
• ST contracts to junior workers and to senior workers of high and low ability.
Therefore, in equilibrium the set of firms
£¤ is partitioned into three subsets, some
of which may be empty: the set R of firms that oﬀer LT contracts, the set R of firms
that oﬀer ST contracts to juniors and hire high-ability seniors and the setR of firms that
oﬀer ST contracts to juniors and hire low-ability seniors. Obviously, the measures of the
sets R and R cannot be arbitrary as they must satisfy the feasibility constraint that
the ratio of the measures of R and R must be equal to the ratio of high- to low-ability
workers ( 
1− ).
We note first that when one considers the analysis of one isolated firm’s optimal
contract, ST contracts are always (at least weakly) dominated by LT contracts. We
do not prove this result, as it is well established in the literature that LT contracts
typically improve the eﬃciency of relationships by allowing both parties to commit to a
sequence of events.16 The intuition is that the firm can always replicate in the LT contract
the optimal sequence of contingent ST contracts. Moreover, LT contracts are typically
superior because the firm, when it signs ST contracts, cannot commit to paying the senior
worker a utility level above his reservation utility. Therefore, if the firm wishes to retain
the senior agent independently of his type, it would obtain higher profits by signing a LT
contract. In other words, we need not consider a fourth set of firms - those that sign ST
contracts and re-hire the same worker as a senior independently of his type - as this set
is always empty in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 uses this idea to show a stronger result: in our environment, a situation
in which all firms sign (optimal) LT contracts with their workers is an equilibrium.
Proposition 1 There is always an equilibrium where all active firms sign LT contracts
with their workers.
16On the optimality of LT contracts versus ST contracts in a single principal-agent model with repeated
moral hazard, see, for instance, Lambert (1983), Rogerson (1985), Malcomson and Spinnewyn (1988),
and Chiappori et al. (1994). This literature analyses the role of commitment, reputation, memory and
renegotiation. In our set-up, the key element is commitment. There is no role for memory, as there is
no past outcome, and there is no role for reputation, as all relevant parameters are public information at
any time.
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If all the firms in the economy sign LT contracts, then no single firm has an incentive
to deviate and oﬀer a sequence of ST contracts. What is the advantage of committing
to a LT relationship? As discussed above, the commitment allows the firm to relax the
limited liability constraint of senior workers by delaying part of their payments as juniors.
ST contracts typically cannot replicate this strategy. Indeed, when the firm designs a ST
agreement for a senior agent, the contract that governed their relationship in the previous
period, when the agent was young, is sunk. Therefore, the firm will only give the agent
the rents that maximise its second-period profits.
The next sections explore equilibria where ST and LT contracts may coexist. We first
discuss how to analyse equilibrium contracts by using a firm’s one-period profits.
3 Equilibria and one-period profits
In equilibrium, no firm can obtain higher expected intertemporal profits by changing the
set of proposed contracts. In this section, we relate this condition to the equilibrium
profits that one firm obtains (or may obtain by changing the contract) in one period.
To illustrate the discussion, we take a firm oﬀering at every period the LT contract
 = (   ∆  ∆)  Because of the single-deviation principle, we consider a
deviation by the firm from the contract it oﬀers to the junior worker that it hires in
a particular period  (it maintains the oﬀer  to agents born in any other period).
If the firm deviates at  to  0 = (0  0 ∆0  0∆0), then it pays 0 at  and
oﬀers (0 ∆0  0∆0) in period  + 1, where the change in income also takes place.
Consequently, switching from  to  0 in  is not profitable for the firm if its profits
at  + 1 are not higher than under  , taking into account that the change in the cost
of the junior worker occurs at . This is equivalent to comparing profits under  and
under  0 but considering the present value of the cost of the junior agent incurred in
the previous period. That is, we impute a cost of 1 and 10 instead of using  and
0 .
The situation is similar if a firm currently oﬀering the contract  decides to oﬀer
the junior worker a ST contract at : the change in the cost of this worker occurs at
, whereas the change in the cost of the senior worker and in income occurs at  + 1.
Additionally, we face the same situation if a firm is currently oﬀering ST contracts and
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plans to deviate to a LT contract at : it changes the agreement with the junior agent at
 to realize the new income at  + 1. Finally, when a firm switches from a ST contract
to another ST contract for the junior agent born at , it hires the junior agent under the
same conditions as before (that is, under the lowest salary that the agent is willing to
accept) and changes his contract at  + 1. Whether we compute the cost of the junior
agent as 1 or  is not relevant for the comparison of profits under the two strategies,
as the firm pays the same cost under both, the old and new contracts.
Therefore, we can develop the analysis of the (stationary) equilibria of our model by
focusing on the profits firms make in one period, provided that we view the cost of the
junior agent as being in the previous period, that is, as long as we associate with the
junior agent a cost of 1 rather than  . Henceforth, we will refer to this level of profits
as “a firm’s one-period profits” and where e =  − 1 + (−∆)−. A firm has
incentives to switch from contract  to contract  0 if and only if e()  e( 0).
4 Long-term contracts in equilibrium
Consider a firm that owns a project  ∈ £¤ and that signs LT contracts with junior
workers. At each period , the firm runs the project with the junior agent that it hires
in period  and with the senior worker that it hired in period  − 1. The senior agent
has ability  with probability  and ability  with probability 1− , as his ability was
unknown at − 1. As previously noted, the ability of the agent is publicly known before
he starts work as a senior; hence, the LT contract signed in − 1 may stipulate payments
contingent on the ability of the agent as a senior.
All workers are ex-ante identical and there are more junior workers than positions
to fill. Therefore, in any period, there are unemployed junior agents willing to accept
any LT contract that provides them with an expected utility equal to their (two-period)
outside utility (1 + ) . Hence, the participation constraint (PC ) specifies that the total
expected utility the worker obtains in the relationship must be at least (1 + ) .
Following the discussion of the previous section, a candidate LT contract for equi-
librium (   ∆  ∆) maximises the firm’s one-period profits, also taking into
account the incentive compatibility (ICC s) and limited liability constraints (LLC ). That
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is, it solves
max
(  ∆ ∆)
 − 1 + ( (−∆)− ) + (1− )( (−∆)− )
s.t.  + 
∙

µ
∆ +  − 1
2
2
¶
+ (1− )
µ
∆ +  − 1
2
2
¶¸
≥ (1 + )
 = ∆ ,  = ∆,  ≥ 0  ≥ 0  ≥ 0.
If the contract does not satisfy this program, then the firm can deviate by oﬀering a
diﬀerent acceptable LT agreement to junior agents and obtain larger discounted profits.
We state the characteristics of the candidate LT contract in Proposition 2, where  ≡
1
 (1 + ) and e ≡p2 + (1− ) 2
Proposition 2 If firm  is in the set R , then it oﬀers the following LT contract:
Region  : If   1
p
2 , then17
 () =
µ
 = 0  =  =  − 12
2e2∆ = ∆ = ¶ 
Region  : If  ∈
h
1

p
2 2
p
2
i
 then
 () =
µ
 = 0  =  = 0∆ = ∆ = 1eq2
¶

Region  : If   2
p
2 then
 () =
µ
 = 0  =  = 0∆ = ∆ = 2
¶

We now explain the main characteristics of the LT contract  (). Owing to moral
hazard arising from limited liability, the firm’s capacity to induce the senior worker to
exert a high eﬀort level is restricted. Therefore, the firm desires to relax the senior agent’s
limited liability constraint, which explains why it concentrates as much as possible of the
agent’s compensation in the agent’s second period of life (i.e., the firm pays to a young
worker the minimum possible wage:  = 0.) Young agents accept low wages because
17In this region, there are other contracts that are also candidates for equilibrium. Because agents
exert first-best eﬀort and there is slack in the LLC constraint, flat wage payments can be shifted across
periods and states while keeping payoﬀs the same for both the agent and the firm. Any combination of
 ,  and  that satisfies  +  ( + (1− )) +  122e2 = (1 + ) , such that each variable
is non-negative, is also a candidate equilibrium, as it would give the same profits to the firm.
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Figure 1: Incentives in the optimal LT contracts
of the credible promise to be “well” paid when they are senior. The limited liability
constraints also explain why, unless  is very low, workers are paid the minimum salary
if the outcome turns out to be a failure:  =  = 0.
The impact of limited liability on bonuses and payoﬀs obtained by agents and firms
diﬀers depending on the profitability of the project  (as well as on the level of agents’
reservation utility (1 + ) and “average” probability of success e). Some characteristics
of the optimal LT contract are shown in Figure 1.
To induce the agent’s first-best eﬀort, firm  must oﬀer him a bonus of ∆ = . If
the value of the project is low (Region  ), the first-best eﬀort-inducing bonus payment
is less than the agent’s outside option. Therefore, the LLC does not bind. Utility is
transferable in this region, so the contract induces the first-best eﬀort ( =  for
 = ) and accompanies these incentives with a transfer payment to match the agent’s
outside option ( =   0).
For  ≥ 1
p
2 , the bonus ∆ =  ensures the agent a utility larger than his outside
option, and the LLC binds. In this case, firm  may pay the agent more than his reser-
vation utility and/or reduce the eﬀort below the first-best level. Firms with intermediate
values of  (Region  ) prefer paying the minimum bonus (∆ = 1
p
2) that gives
the agent his outside option rather than making an additional transfer to the agent. In
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this region, both the LLC and the PC are binding, the contract does not include fixed
payments and the senior agent’s eﬀort is  = 
p
2 for  = .
In Region  , the value of  is suﬃciently high that firms choose to increase the
bonus beyond that given by the PC. In this region, bonuses are no longer influenced by
the PC but by the LLC. Given the firm’s cost of transferring rents to agents, the firm, at
the optimum, shares half of the value of the project with the senior agent in the event of
success (∆ = 
2
) to induce the senior worker to supply eﬀort  = 12 for  = .
Thus, the agent obtains rents in addition to his outside option.
The next corollary provides the expression of the firm’s one-period profits for  ().
Corollary 1 The firm’s one-period profits under  () are:
Region  : If   1
p
2 , then e () =  −  + 1
2
2e2
Region  : If  ∈
h
1

p
2 2
p
2
i
 then e () =  +ep2 − 2
Region  : If   2
p
2 then e () =  + 1
4
2e2
The profit function e () is continuously diﬀerentiable and convex in .
5 Short-term contracts in equilibrium
All firms signing ST contracts hire similar young workers, as they are indistinguishable
ex-ante. With respect to senior workers, firms can decide to hire high-ability or low-ability
workers.
Consider an equilibrium where some firms sign ST contracts, with a fraction of those
firms oﬀering contracts to high-ability senior agents. Denote by  the (minimum) level
of utility that this type of agent obtains in equilibrium.18 Similarly, denote by  the
(minimum) level of utility obtained by low-ability senior workers. Both  and  exceed
or equal  Additionally, given the limited liability constraint and competition among
firms,  and possibly  may strictly exceed  Therefore, a junior agent will sign a
ST contract that provides a utility level less than  provided that the reduction does not
exceed the expected extra utility he will obtain as a senior. Formally, the salary  that
18Given the limited liability constraint, the participation constraint may not be relevant. Therefore,
the equilibrium level of utility may diﬀer for identical senior agents, depending on the firm that hires
them. A firm with a very high  ends up providing its senior agent a utility level higher than  , as its
participation constraint will not be binding (see also Alonso-Paulí and Pérez-Castrillo, 2012).
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the junior agent will accept must satisfy:
 +  [ + (1− )] ≥ (1 + ) ,
where  and  are the expected utilities of high- and low-ability workers, respectively.
For example, if all low-ability workers obtain the same utility  in the possible jobs,
then  = .
The candidate equilibrium contract oﬀer of firm  inR (R) to a high- (low-) ability
senior agent must be the optimal one-period contract for this agent, taking into account
that it must grant him a level of utility of at least  (); that is, it must solve
max
(∆)
 +  (−∆)− 
s.t. ∆ +  − 1
2
2 ≥ 
 = ∆
 ≥ 0
for  = . The next proposition states the candidate equilibrium contract for those
firms.
Proposition 3 If firm  is in the set R with  ∈ {}, then it oﬀers the following
ST contract to a senior agent:
Region  (): If   1
√
2, then
 () =
µ
 =  − 12
22 ∆ = 
¶

Region  (): If  ∈
h
1

√
2 2
√
2
i
 then
 () =
µ
 = 0 ∆ = 1
p
2
¶

Region  (): If   2
√
2 then
 () =
µ
 = 0 ∆ = 2
¶

In Region  (), a senior agent’s eﬀort is the first-best level eﬀort  = 
whereas in Region  (), his eﬀort is less than the first-best level:  =
√
2 In
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these two regions, the agent’s expected utility is  Finally, in Region  (), where the
project value is very high, the senior agent’s eﬀort is  = 12 for  =  and he
receives a rent in addition to . His expected utility in this region is 1822  
Corollary 2 states the expression for the firm’s one-period profits under  (),
where  denotes the equilibrium salary paid to junior agents.
Corollary 2 A firm  in the set R with  ∈ {}, obtains the following one-period
profits under  ()
Region  (): If   1
√
2, then e ¡  ¢ =  + 1222 −  − 1 
Region  (): If  ∈
h
1

√
2 2
√
2
i
 then
e ¡  ¢ =  − 2 + √2 − 1 
Region  (): If   2
√
2 then e ¡  ¢ =  + 1422 − 1 
The profit function e ¡  ¢ is continuously diﬀerentiable and convex in .
6 Equilibrium matching and equilibrium contracts
The previous sections identify the equilibrium contracts, once we know the type of agree-
ments firms oﬀer (that is, once the sets R , R and R are determined) and the levels
of utility  and  that they must guarantee to low- and high-ability agents, respec-
tively. In the present section, we characterise equilibria where at least some firms oﬀer ST
contracts. Therefore, we identify the distribution of firms in R , R and R, the levels
 and  and the minimum salary  that firms oﬀer junior agents in ST contracts.
We seek equilibria where  =  . Firms will not compete for low-ability workers.19
On the other hand, the level of  will be determined by the equilibrium conditions, that
is, by the (marginal) firm’s willingness to pay to attract a high-ability worker rather than
either attracting a low-ability one, or signing a LT contract.
Why might some firms be interested in LT relationships while others prefer to secure
high-ability agents through ST contracts? In particular, why would a firm choose a strat-
egy that implies contracting low-ability agents through ST contracts, instead of oﬀering
LT contracts and sometimes benefiting from high-ability senior agents? The two main
equilibrium variables that cause firms to prefer one or another type of contract are the
19However, in equilibrium, the measure of senior workers with low ability is the same as the measure
of firms seeking them. Therefore, other equilibria may exist where    for all low-ability players.
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salary of a young worker  (or rather the comparison between  and ) and the
diﬀerence between the cost of a high- versus a low-ability senior agent, that is,  − 
Firms that obtain large profits in the event of success, that is, firms with a high ,
are willing to pay a high price to always hire a good senior agent. Therefore, firms at
the right end of the interval
£¤ must be those most interested in signing ST contracts
with high-ability senior agents. Similarly, firms that care little about agents’ eﬀorts, i.e.,
firms with a low , pay more attention to the potential savings they can obtain through
a junior’s contract if they oﬀer him a ST contract than to the gains obtained through a
LT contract or by securing a high-ability agent. Therefore, firms at the left end of
£¤
are candidates to sign ST contracts to hire low-ability senior agents.
Lemma 1 provides the first confirmation of these intuitions. It compares the slopes,
in terms of , of the profits obtained from the diﬀerent types of contract.
Lemma 1 The slopes of the profit functions satisfy the following relations:
(a) 
 (  )  

 (), for all  ;
(b) 
 (  )  
 (  ), for all  , and for all  ≥  ; and
(c)  ()  
 (  ), for all  , if either   
2
2 or 2e2  2.
A firm’s ST profits increase with the value of success  when it hires a low-ability
worker. However, this increase is smaller than that of a firm’s profits under the optimal LT
contract (part (a)). It is also smaller than the rate at which its profits increase if it hires
a high-ability worker through a ST contract (part (b)). These relations are explained by
the fact that a higher  implies a greater interest in securing the services of a high-ability
worker. A similar argument provides the intuition for part (c) of the lemma.
Let us denote by b the value that would “balance” the set of firms if all the firms
with   b hired low-ability workers, while all the firms with  ≥ b hired high-ability
workers, that is, b is characterised by
( b) = 1− 
Additionally, we denote by  the value that makes the firm indiﬀerent between using
LT contracts and hiring low-ability senior workers through ST contracts, when the junior
salary is  = 0. That is,  is characterised by
e () = e ( 0 ).
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Theorem 1 states an equilibrium when  ∈
h
 b´, that is, where some of the firms in
the market have a low-valued project, but there is a relatively high number of firms with
valuable projects. The theorem shows that, in this case, ST and LT contracts coexist
in the market. Theorem 1 presents the result in the case where 2 
³
1 + 1
´
2, that
is,  is suﬃciently high with respect to . This hypothesis allows us to describe the
equilibrium in a simple manner. However, as we will discuss at the end of this section,
the coexistence of the two types of contract does not depend on this assumption.
Theorem 1 Suppose  ≤   b, and denote by  the firm such that  () =
(1− ) (1−()). Then, if 2 
³
1 + 1
´
2, an equilibrium exists where
(i) firms with  ≤  oﬀer ST contracts:  = 0 to junior workers and  () to
low-ability senior workers,
(ii) firms with  ∈ ( ) oﬀer LT contracts  (),
(iii) firms with  ≥  oﬀer ST contracts:  = 0 to junior workers and  ( )
to high-ability senior workers, where  is such that e () = e ( 0  ),
(iv) junior workers accept both LT contracts that guarantee them (1 + ) and ST con-
tracts with  = 0, and
(v) senior workers accept contracts that guarantee them  .20
The rationale behind Theorem 1 is as follows. Firms with more profitable projects
attach greater importance to hiring high-ability workers. They can ensure the services of
these workers by signing ST contracts and oﬀering a high salary to attract senior agents of
high ability. Therefore, the expected utility  obtained by agents who sign ST contracts
and turn out to be high-ability senior workers is considerably higher than their outside
option. This prospect increases the expected utility of junior workers who accept ST
contracts: if they turn out to be of high ability they obtain a high utility level. The
expectation of this potential reward leads junior workers to accept a wage of  = 0,
which is less than their reservation utility  because they will be compensated in the
future (in terms of expected utility) for this sacrifice. Firms with low  take advantage
of the reduction in the wage oﬀered to junior workers who sign ST contracts: the value of
their projects is suﬃciently low so that the reduction in the wage of junior agents more
than oﬀsets the fact that they always end up hiring low-ability senior workers.
20At equilibrium, high-ability workers receive a level of utility of at least    . However, out of
equilibrium, they should be ready to accept lower oﬀers, as long as they guarantee  .
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The firms with the best projects sign ST contracts because they are willing to pay a
high premium to ensure the services of high-ability workers, whereas the firms with the
worst projects sign ST contracts to benefit from the low salaries of junior workers. Firms
with intermediate  find high-ability workers to be too expensive. However, they benefit
enough from the ability of such workers that the reduction in the salary of junior workers
does not compensate for the loss they suﬀer by giving up the possibility of retaining high-
ability workers. Therefore, they commit to LT contracts and benefit from the advantages
arising from this type of agreement.
Theorem 1 shows positive assortative matching between senior workers and firms but
only for firms with the best and worst projects. First, the property that high-ability
agents work for firms with higher-value projects follows from our choice of production
function, which yields a match-value function of  +  − 1
2
2 that is supermodular.
In addition, supermodularity is preserved when we take into account the moral hazard
problem and the firm’s optimal choice of incentive scheme, which depends on the project
value. Therefore, in the regions where the market for senior agents exists, the matching
is positive assortative. Second, the theorem also highlights that the market for senior
agents does not exist for firms with intermediate projects. They enter into LT contracts
and remain matched even after new information about types is revealed. Similarly to
the “coarse matching” literature, the coexistence of LT and ST contracts demonstrates
that the trade-oﬀ between eﬃcient contracting and eﬃcient sorting need not be all-or-
nothing.21
Figure 2 indicates LT and ST profits as a function of , for equilibrium values of
salaries and utility  . In the figure, we represent the functions for the following pa-
rameters:  = 09,  = 02,  = 01,  = 05,  = 005,  = 1, and where ()
is the uniform distribution function in [05 85]. As shown in Lemma 1, the slope of
e ( 0  ) is larger (because  is suﬃciently high) than that of e ()  which
in turn is larger than the slope of e ( 0 ). In equilibrium, the market price that a
firm must pay to attract a high-ability worker ( ) is such that the three profit functions
cross, as shown in Figure 2.
21Coarse matching provides a middle ground between perfect sorting and random matching. For
example, under coarse matching types might sort into group buckets, but match randomly within the
buckets (see, for example, Chao and Wilson, 1987, and Hoppe, Moldovanu and Ozdenoren, 2011).
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Figure 2: Profit Functions
Expected long-term profits are a convex combination of profits of the two possible
realisations of agent type. In Figure 3, we decompose the LT profits function into the
profits obtained through a LT contract when the agent turns out to be of type, e ()
(in circles) and the profits when he turns out to be of type , e () (in boxes). Note
in particular that profits are higher under a LT contract when the agent turns out to be
of high-ability than under a ST contract for suﬃciently high values of .22
The previous numerical example also enables us to show that ST contracts favour
ability. The expected utility of some high-ability seniors is much higher (and that of some
seniors of low ability is lower) when LT and ST contracts coexist in equilibrium than
when there are only LT contracts. At the right end of Figure 4, we observe a significant
increase in the expected utility of high ability agents who sign ST contracts with very
productive firms (high s) compared to the utility they would have obtained with LT
contracts. Conversely, the use of ST contracts in equilibrium makes low-ability workers
worse-oﬀ than under LT contracts (left-hand side of Figure 4). Furthermore, if we view the
population of firms as an industry composed of businesses of varying quality, our model
22Although it is diﬃcult to see it in the figure, in Region  profits for the LT contracts when the agent
happens to be of type  are lower than profits for the ST contracts with workers of type .
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Figure 3: Profits with LT contracts depending on the type of the senior worker
provides an explanation for the observation that some firms reward their employees with
higher wages than others, even when employees are otherwise identical (see, for example,
Katz and Autor, 1999). High-ability seniors working in firms with moderately profitable
projects have signed LT contracts and end up receiving compensations determined by
their reservation utility, whereas the compensation of those who sign ST contracts is
determined by competition. The latter end up working for high profit firms, supply more
eﬀort, and obtain higher utility. In contrast, low productivity workers in permanent jobs
at moderately profitable firms receive higher payments as seniors and provide higher eﬀort
than their equals who signed ST contracts.
It is interesting to compare, in terms of eﬃciency, the equilibria obtained in Theorem
1 and in Proposition 1, where all firms sign LT contracts. On the one hand, we check
that the equilibrium stated in Theorem 1 is preferred by firms to that in Proposition 1.
First, firms’ profits under LT contracts are the same in both scenarios, as junior workers’
outside option is the same in both cases. Second, firms that choose ST contracts in the
equilibrium stated in Theorem 1 could have chosen LT contracts; therefore, their profits
are higher under ST agreements (they are strictly higher in the interior of the regions).
Third, a LT contract is certainly the best choice for any firm in the equilibrium described
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Figure 4: Expected utility of a senior agent of type  and when he signs the equilibrium
contract with a firm. In parentheses, the expected utility if he had signed a LT contract.
in Proposition 1, as there is no market for high-ability and low-ability senior workers
(if all the other senior workers are hired through LT contracts, the only possibility for
the firm would be to retain its worker if it were to sign a ST agreement). Therefore,
the equilibrium in Theorem 1 gives the firms a broader choice of contracts, and they are
better-oﬀ.
On the other hand, the comparison between the two equilibria is not immediate for
the workers. Although all junior workers are indistinguishable when they sign their equi-
librium contracts, and they perform identical jobs, their expected utility varies depending
on the type of agreement they are oﬀered. Under a LT contract, a junior worker expects
a total utility of (1 + ) if the firm’s project  is not too high. However, if  is high
(  2
p
2), then his expected utility exceeds (1 + ) because the firm decides to
increase his work incentives through an additional rent. Moreover, the expected utility of
any worker who signs a ST contract with any firm is at least  [ + (1− ) ], which
is strictly higher than (1 + ) .
The next proposition shows that, under the assumptions in Theorem 1, workers are
also better-oﬀ when ST and LT contracts coexist. The additional utility (in excess of the
outside option) obtained by workers is larger when ST contracts are oﬀered. It also shows
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that, in terms of total eﬃciency, the set of firms that sign ST contracts is still too small.
Proposition 4 Suppose  ≤   b and 2  ³1 + 1´ 2. Then
(i) the equilibrium with coexistence of LT and ST contracts proposed in Theorem 1 is
preferred by firms and workers to the equilibrium proposed in Proposition 1; and
(ii) given  , total welfare increases when the set of firms using ST contracts in the
equilibrium proposed in Theorem 1 is marginally enlarged.
To briefly discuss the eﬃciency properties of the equilibrium with coexistence of LT
and ST contracts, note that one possible interpretation of our model is that it analyses
the trade-oﬀ between moral hazard and the optimal assignment of firms and workers. In
this respect, it is useful to first examine the two extremes. On the one hand, if all workers
were identical, then any assignment would be optimal and LT contracts would produce a
higher total surplus than ST contracts because they alleviate the moral hazard problem.
In addition, in equilibrium, we would only observe LT contracts. On the other hand,
if there were no moral hazard problem (i.e., if eﬀort were verifiable) then ST contracts
would be eﬃcient because they allow for the optimal assignment of firms and agents. In
this case, an equilibrium in which all firms sign ST contracts (and high-ability senior
workers receive a level of utility b characterised by e ³ b´ = e ³ b 0 b´)
exists. Therefore, in the two extreme environments, the equilibrium assignment and
contract length are socially optimal. Proposition 4 states that when there is a trade-oﬀ
between moral hazard and optimal assignment, first, it is socially beneficial that some
firms hire through ST contracts in equilibrium (part (i)) but, second, the equilibrium
is not socially eﬃcient: the market leads to overuse of LT contracts (part (ii)). The
latter result contrasts with the equivalence between the competitive equilibrium and the
planner’s solution when the trade-oﬀ is between productive and informational eﬃciency
(see Anderson and Smith, 2010, and Eeckhout and Weng, 2010). In our environment, a
firm cannot appropriate the benefits that its worker would obtain when switching from a
LT to a ST contract because limited liability (which is a relevant constraint in the moral
hazard problem) prevents decreasing the junior’s salary.23
23The ineﬃciency does not depend on the level of the workers’ outside option or on the property that
type  senior workers are not compensated beyond their outside option, as long as the limited liability
constraint for the junior workers is binding.
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Next, we consider the case where b is lower than , that is, the population of firms
has a high concentration of firms with a low .
Theorem 2 Suppose b ≤  and either 2e2  2 or b is larger than a certain cut-oﬀ
value   .24 Then, if 2 
³
1 + 1
´
2 an equilibrium exists where
(i) firms with   b oﬀer ST contracts: b = max{(1 + )− ( + (1− ))  0}
to junior workers and  () to low-ability senior workers,
(ii) firms with  ≥ b oﬀer ST contracts: b to junior workers and  ( b) to high-
ability senior workers, where b is such that e ³ b b  ´ = e ³ b b  b´
(iii) junior workers accept both ST contracts with b and LT contracts that guarantee
them (1 + ) , and
(iv) senior workers accept contracts that guarantee them  .
The basic trade-oﬀs between the several contractual forms a firm can choose from do
not depend on whether b is higher or lower than . Therefore, the intuition behind
Theorem 2 is similar to that behind Theorem 1. However, no firm is interested in oﬀering
LT contracts when b ≤ . ST contracts for low-ability agents provide higher profits
than LT contracts for any firm with  ≤  while ST contracts with high-ability agents
are better than LT contracts for firms with  ≥ b (given b and b). Therefore, there
is no space for the intermediate region in which LT contracts are the best alternative.
Theorem 2 presents a situation where, in equilibrium, the market is composed only of
firms oﬀering ST contracts. When b ≤ , most firms give a low value to success, as most
firms are below . Therefore, they care more about decreasing the cost of junior agents
than about the additional incentives provided by LT contracts. In fact, firms with low 
may benefit from the existence of firms with high  in such a way that even the marginal
firm b may strictly prefer ST contracts (either with low- or high-ability workers) than
LT contracts! This occurs when   b (and b  0), in which case junior workers
accept very low salaries because they may migrate, as seniors, to firms with very high ,
giving them high rents.
Finally, we consider the case where  is large (or  is very small), that is, where only
firms with high-valued projects are in the market.
24The cut-oﬀ value  may be lower than  so that the theorem applies to all b ≤ . However, if
 is very low and 2e2 ≥ 2 , then an equilibrium like the one described in the theorem may not exist if
most of the firms have a very low productivity parameter .
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Theorem 3 Suppose   . Then, no equilibrium exists in which ST contracts are
adopted.
When   , all firms value their projects enough so that none is ready to oﬀer
ST contracts to permanently retain low-ability workers. They would rather oﬀer LT
agreements, which ensures them high-ability workers with some probability.
Finally, we discuss the extension of theorems 1 and 2 if the assumption 2 
³
1 + 1
´
2
does not hold. In what follows, we propose a constructive way to find an equilibrium
for any set of parameters. As above, we denote by  the unique value that satisfies
e () = e ( 0 ) In the case where   , we are in the framework of
Theorem 3 Therefore, we analyse the cases where  ≥ .
Consider first a market where   b. We can then proceed in a similar manner as in
Theorem 1. We denote by  a firm such that  () = (1− ) () and by  the
level of utility that makes the firm  indiﬀerent between using LT contracts and hiring
high-ability senior workers through ST contracts when the junior salary is  = 0 that
is, e () = e ( 0  )  If the agents’ participation constraint is satisfied for
 , that is,  + (1 − ) ≥  +  , then Theorem 1 holds. (For example, under
assumption 2 
³
1 + 1
´
2, the participation constraint always holds.) For the remain-
der of the discussion, it is useful to briefly comment on the method of proof in Theorem 1:
We begin by computing the value  such that e () = e ( 0 ). We then
show that  + (1− ) =  +  Then, given that    because   , we
observe that the participation constraint is also satisfied for  . If 2 ≤
³
1 + 1
´
2, we
can also compute  and  .25 However, we can not immediately extend the previous
argument because, in this case,  + (1− )   +  . Therefore, Theorem 1 only
holds with the proposed contracts if  is suﬃciently high compared to  , that is, when
 is high enough.26
In the case where   b but  + (1− )   +  , we adapt the method to
find an equilibrium as follows. We define (), (), and  () as before, except
25In particular,  = 1√1+ 1−

√
2 if 2 ∈
h³
1 + 14(1+)
´
2
³
1 + 1
´
2
i
and  =
2
−√2−2
2
p
2 if 2 
³
1 + 14(1+)
´
2.  lies in regions  and  () in the first case, whereas
 lies in regions  and  () in the second case.
26Note that we can apply Lemma 1 (c) if  satisfies the agent’s participation constraint and  = 0
because, in this case,  is always higher than 
2
2 .
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that the values are computed when the junior salary is  =   027 We look for the
salary ∗ such that ∗ +  (∗) + (1 − ) =  +  . If (∗) ≥ , then an
equilibrium similar to the one presented in Theorem 1 holds. In this case, the regions
and equilibrium contracts are obtained by substituting (∗), (∗), and  (∗) for
, , and  in Theorem 1.28 On the other hand, if (∗)  , then there is no
equilibrium where firms oﬀer ST contracts, and Theorem 3 applies.
Consider now a market where  ≥ b We then denote by 0 the salary such that
 (0) = b We distinguish two cases. If the participation constraint does not hold for
0, that is, if 0 +  (0) + (1− )   +  , then we proceed as in the previous
paragraphs until we find ∗. Therefore, either an equilibrium similar to Theorem 1 (for
∗) or Theorem 3 holds, depending on whether (∗) is lower or higher than . On the
other hand, if 0 +  (0) + (1 − ) ≥  +  , then the equilibrium proposed in
Theorem 2, where only ST contracts are signed, holds.
7 Endogenous set of firms
In this section, we briefly comment on the hypothesis concerning the set of active firms.
We have assumed that the set of firms active in the market is fixed and measured by
the distribution function  () on the set £¤  Therefore, we have made the implicit
assumption that, irrespective of the market outcome, all firms find it worthwhile to remain
active in the market. This assumption can be sustained either because the worst firm has
a suﬃciently profitable project (i.e.,  is high enough) or because the fixed component of
the firms’ activity ( ) is suﬃciently high. However, in general, the set of active firms is
endogenous; it depends on the profitability of the market.
Suppose that the set of potential firms is distributed in the interval
£
0 ¤  according
to some distribution function () The set of active firms £¤ will be determined by
the condition that, in equilibrium, the profits of firm  are zero and the distribution ()
is derived from (). The level of  will depend on the values of the parameters in the
27 ()  b for all  because  () is decreasing in . Moreover,  () is decreasing in .
28The salary ∗ always exists and is not larger than  because  ()   for all . We also note
that, as in Theorem 2, the proposed equilibrium might not hold if 2e2 ≥ 2 or, after the process, 
is lower than 
2
2 so that we cannot apply Lemma 1 (c). The same caveat applies to the candidate
proposed in the next paragraph.
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model. We can discuss, for example, how changes in the parameter  aﬀect the set of
active firms and the type of contracts signed in the market.
If  is very low, then the minimum  (and also b) is high. Therefore,  (which
does not depend on the distribution of firms) is lower than  and, in equilibrium, only
LT contracts are signed. When  increases, both  and b decrease until we obtain the
region where ST contracts appear for low and high values of . Additional increases in 
cause the regions in which there are ST contracts to expand until only ST contracts exist
in equilibrium. Therefore, we should expect a prevalence of ST contracts in those markets
where the “fixed” component of revenue (that is, the component that does not depend
on incentives) is large, whereas we should observe LT contracts in those markets in which
most income is earned through work that is subject to moral hazard. This, in fact, reflects
the main trade-oﬀ that firms face. Focusing solely on incentives, LT contracts are better
as they can exploit the intertemporal nature of the firm/worker relationship to alleviate
the moral hazard problem. On the other hand, ST contracts oﬀer an added flexibility that
improves the eﬃciency of firm/worker matching. If market characteristics are such that
incentives play an important role in all firms’ profits, then LT contracts prevail. However,
if appropriate worker selection is the key issue, then ST contracts are used in equilibrium.
8 Conclusion
We have introduced and analysed an equilibrium model to discuss the advantages and
disadvantages of short-term versus long-term contracts in a dynamic environment where
senior workers are subject to moral hazard. On the one hand, long-term contracts are
better for providing incentives because they enable firms to credibly transfer payments
from earlier to later periods over the term of a worker’s employment, and this transfer
alleviates the incentive compatibility constraint. On the other hand, short-term contracts
allow the market to achieve better matching between the abilities of agents and the needs
of firms. Those agents who turn out to have high ability can be hired by firms that profit
the most from employing them.
When firms operating very profitable projects29 identify talented workers, they are
29Projects for which the incentives of the senior workers play an important role in firms’ profits (firms
with high ).
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willing to oﬀer them high salaries or bonuses. High-ability seniors end up receiving high
remuneration when short-term contracts are in place, which in turn results in reduced
pay for juniors, who foresee the prospects of high wages as seniors. Consequently, firms
with less lucrative ventures30 may not be able to retain high-ability workers, but they
indirectly profit from the existence of these workers because they allow the firms to hire
junior workers at a much lower cost.
We find equilibria in which two types of firms use short-term contracts: firms for which
the success of a project strongly depends on the senior worker’s eﬀort and that generally
end up hiring high-ability senior workers, and firms whose profits do not greatly depend
on eﬀort and that therefore hire low-ability senior workers. Intermediate firms may use
long- or short-term contracts, depending on various market characteristics.
In addition to the equilibrium with short-term contracts, a situation that often exists,
there always exists an equilibrium in which all firms choose long-term contracts (see
Proposition 1). However, we argue that, in our modelling environment, whenever an
equilibrium with short-term contracts and one with only long-term contracts coexist, the
former is more "robust" as the latter is a “knife-edge” result. The outcome in which all
firms use long-term contracts is sustained by the fact that, if no other firms oﬀer short-
term contracts, no firm can profit from the enhanced flexibility that short-term contracts
provide. However, a small subset of the best and worst firms has incentives to switch
from long-term to short-term contracts. Given the equilibrium salary that would accrue
to high-ability workers following this such a deviation, junior agents would be willing to
accept low salaries and all the firms that deviate would obtain higher profits.
Finally, we comment on the assumption of symmetric information between firms and
workers. A natural and interesting extension of our model, beyond the scope of this
paper, is the introduction of private information about agents’ abilities. If young workers
have an informational advantage regarding over firms regarding their future managing
ability, the choice of contract takes on an additional role as a screening mechanism. In
this line, Matutes et al. (1994) present the choice of compensation schemes by two firms
that compete in a labour market in which agents are heterogeneous and have private
information about their skills. The authors show that, in equilibrium, one firm may oﬀer
a wage rate, whereas another may oﬀer a piece rate. By proposing diﬀerent compensation
30Firms in which the role played by the senior worker is less important to the outcome.
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schemes, firms induce self-selection among workers. Similarly, Loh (1994) discusses how
employment probation can serve as a sorting device, as it induces self-selection by workers.
Firms oﬀering probationary employment tend to attract workers who are more confident
in their capabilities.
In the framework of our paper, firms choose both the intensity of incentives and the
length of contracts. If young workers have private information about their abilities, firms
may try to screen them when they are young, which would induce a matching between
heterogenous firms and heterogenous agents already in the first period of agents’ lives. For
example, assume young workers have perfect information about their type. Then, firms
can compete for the high-ability workers through LT contracts that separate types. Firms
with high  can hire high-ability workers by oﬀering them large second-period incentives
while proposing extremely low payoﬀs for low-ability workers. Firms with low  can
hire low-ability workers through an optimal LT contract. In this case, in equilibrium, the
eﬃcient assignment is achieved from the very beginning and we only observe LT contracts
in equilibrium: they allow for screening of workers and a better provision of incentives.
The advantage of ST contracts as a sorting mechanism vanishes.
However, if young workers have private but incomplete information about their abil-
ities, then ST contracts may still play a role. Consider a situation where young agents
have more precise information than firms have about the probability that they will turn
out to be high-ability senior workers; agents’ types will become public information once
they have worked as junior workers. The previous argument then suggests that the region
where LT contracts are optimal would expand, but the advantage of ST contracts as a
sorting device remains.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We first note that, in a situation in which all firms sign
LT contracts, if a firm follows the strategy of oﬀering ST contracts to its workers, it
necessarily hires as senior agent at period  the same agent that it hired as a junior at
period −1. Also, the only alternative occupation for the senior agent is to get out of the
market, since no other firm is interested in hiring him, independent on his ability. Then,
any sequence of ST contracts can be replicated as a LT contract. Therefore, the optimal
ST contracts cannot provide higher profits than the optimal LT contracts.
Proof of Proposition 2. Substituting  and  by their value and multiplying
33
the objective function by , the firm’s program can be rewritten as:
max
(  ∆ ∆)
 + 
µ
1
2
2∆ (−∆)− 
¶
+ (1− )
µ
1
2
2∆ (−∆)− 
¶
− 
s.t.  + 
µ
1
2
2∆2 + 
¶
+ (1− )
µ
1
2
2∆2 + 
¶
≥ (1 + ) (1)
 ≥ 0  ≥ 0  ≥ 0.
Let  ,  and  be the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the constraints. The
Kuhn-Tucker (first-order) conditions of the above maximization problem include the con-
straints, and the non-negativity of the multipliers:  ≥ 0,  ≥ 0,  ≥ 0,  ≥ 0 The
derivatives of the Lagrangian with respect to ∆ and ∆ are:
2(− 2∆) + 2∆ = 0 (2)
 (1− ) 2(− 2∆) +  (1− ) 2∆ = 0 (3)
Equations (2) and (3) imply that ∆ = ∆, which we denote ∆ in the rest of the proof.
The derivatives of the Lagrangian with respect to  ,  and  are:
−1 + +  = 0
− +  +  = 0 (4)
−(1− ) + (1− ) +  = 0
which imply  = 1− ,  =  (1− ) and  = (1− ) (1− ) ; therefore, either the
three constraints are binding or none is. The last Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:

∙
 + 
∙

µ
 + 1
2
2∆2
¶
+ (1− )
µ
 + 1
2
2∆2
¶¸
− (1 + )
¸
= 0
 = 0,  = 0 and  = 0
From (2) and (4) we can deduce that:
 = 2− ∆ and  = 
µ
∆ − 1
¶

We study the diﬀerent regions where the Kuhn-Tucker conditions may be satisfied:
Region  :  =  =  = 0. Then  = 1 and ∆ = . We write the participation
constraint as
 +  ( + (1− )) + 1
2
2e2 = (1 + )
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Any combination of  ,  and  that satisfies the previous constraint and such that
the three values are larger or equal to 0 constitutes an optimal solution (in particular,
the values proposed in the proposition). This type of solution can exist only if  +
 ( + (1− )) ≥ 0, that is  ≤ 1
p
2 .
Region  :   0,   0,   0,   0 Payments when young and in case of failure
are  =  =  = 0 and the bonus in case of success is ∆ = 1
p
2 . Finally, this is a
candidate only if  ∈ [0 1], i.e.,  ∈
h
1

p
2 2
p
2
i
 The candidate at the lower bound
of this region coincides with the candidate at the higher bound of Region  .
Region  :   0   0,   0,  = 0. Then  =  =  = 0, and ∆ = 2 . In this
case the participation constraint holds only if  ≥ 2
p
2 The candidate at the lower
bound of this region coincides with the candidate at the higher bound of Region  .
The unique candidate for each value of is the optimal solution of the firm’s maximization
program. From the optimal contract in each case, it is immediate to compute agent’s
eﬀort(s) and utility, and firm’s profits. Additionally, easy calculations show that the
function e () is continuously diﬀerentiable in .
Proof of Proposition 3. Substituting  by its value in the firm’s program, we can
rewrite it as
max
(∆)
 + 2∆ (−∆)− 
s.t.
1
2
2∆2 +  ≥ 
 ≥ 0.
Let   be the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the constraints. The Kuhn-Tucker
(first-order) conditions of the above maximization problem include the constraints, and
the non-negativity of the multipliers:  ≥ 0,  ≥ 0 The derivatives of the Lagrangian
with respect to  and ∆ are
−1 + +  = 0 (5)
2 (− 2∆) + 2∆ = 0 (6)
From (5) and (6) we can deduce that:
 = 2− ∆ and  =

∆ − 1
We study the diﬀerent regions.
Region  ():  = 0. Then ∆ = , which implies  = 1  0. The participation
35
constraint is 1
2
22+ =  Therefore,  = − 1222 ≥ 0 if and only if  ≤ 1
√
2
Region  ():   0,   0 Payments are  = 0 and∆ = 1
√
2. This is a candidate
only if  ≥ 0 and  ≥ 0, i.e.,  ∈
h
1

√ 2
√
2
i

Region  ():   0,  = 0. Then  = 0, and ∆ = 2 . In this case the participation
constraint holds only if  ≥ 2
√
2
The unique candidate for each value of is the optimal solution of the firm’s maximization
program. From the optimal contract in each case, it is immediate to compute agent’s
eﬀort(s) and utility.
Proof of Lemma 1. We highlight that the three derivatives that we consider in the
lemma, 
 (  ), 

 (), and 
 (  ), have a similar shape: they are
first linear in  until they reach some 1 (either 1
√
2 , or 1
p
2 , or 1
√
2), then
they are constant until they reach a second threshold 2 and, from 2 on, they are linear
in  again. The proof of the three parts in the lemma is similar. We write a complete
proof of part (a) and we point out the main elements of parts (b) and (c).
(a) First, notice that if  lies in both regions  () and  , 
 = 2  e2 =

  The same comparison holds if  lies in both regions  () and  . Additionally,
if  lies in both regions  () and  , 
 = 
√
2  ep2 =  
Second, if 1
p
2 ≥ 1
√
2 (and 2
p
2 ≥ 2
√
2), then  is increasing in a
larger region of parameters than 
 before becoming constant (at a higher level than
 in region  ()). Finally, even if 
 starts increasing again (i.e., it reaches
region  ()) before  (because 2
√
2 ≤ 2
p
2), it is always lower than the latter
because it is lower even when  = 2
p
2 , given that we have seen that   


for any  which lies in both regions  () and  .
Third, suppose 1
p
2  1
√
2 (and 2
p
2  2
√
2). Given that  is smaller
than  when
 reaches the region where it becomes constant, and that it is
certainly also smaller when it starts increasing again (because  has reached this
region before), it is not possible that the two derivatives cross. Therefore, 
  


for any   0.
(b) If  lies in both regions  () and  (), 
 = 2  2 = 
  The
same comparison holds in regions  () and  (). Also, if  lies in both regions
 () and  (), 
 = 
√
2  √2 =   The rest of the proof is
identical to the one in part (a).
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(c) For  in both regions  and  () (and similarly in  and  ()),

 = e2  2 =  . If  lies in both regions  and  (), then  =ep2  √2 =  if and only if   22 . If this inequality holds, the rest of
the proof of part (c) is identical to the one in part (a). Otherwise, suppose  ≤ 22
and 2e2  2 . In this case, 2√2  1p2 (because  ≤ 22  12  14).
Notice that   
 up to
1

√
2 ,  is constant in
h
1

√
2  2
√
2
i


 is constant in
h
1

p
2 2
p
2
i
and   
 from
2

p
2 (therefore, also
from 1
p
2 on). Therefore, if  ≥ 
 at some , it is necessarily the case that
the inequality holds either at  = 2
√
2 or  = 1
p
2 . Notice that both  =
2

√
2 and 1
p
2 lye in regions  and  ()) However,  ( = 2
√
2) =e2 2√2  122 2√2 =  ( = 2√2) because e2  122 and, for the same
reason,  ( = 1
p
2)   ( = 1
p
2).
Proof of Theorem 1. We do the proof through a series of claims.
Claim 1: If  = 0, then   1
√
2 and   1
p
2 .
Proof of Claim 1: If the value  that satisfies e () = e ( 0 ) lies in both
regions  and  () (i.e.,   1
p
2 and   1
√
2), then from the expressions
of e () and e ( 0 ) it follows that  = 1(2−2)√2 Moreover, it is
easy to check that each of the inequalities   1
√
2 and   1
p
2 is equivalent to
2 
³
1 + 1
´
2, which is the condition required in the theorem
Claim 2: Consider the value  such that e () = e ( 0 ) (that is,
e ( 0 ) = e ( 0 )). If junior workers anticipate that they will obtain at
least  when senior if they turn out to be high-ability, then they are ready to accept
 = 0.
Proof of Claim 2: We proceed as follows. We conjecture that  is such that  
1

p
2  we compute the corresponding  in this region, and then we will show that
it is indeed the case that   1
p
2 . Therefore,  is defined by
 −  + 1
2
22 =  −  + 12
22
i.e.,  =  + 12 (2 − 2)2 or  =
³
1 + 1
´
 For this value,   2
p if
and only if 1(2−2)
 1
r³
1 + 1
´
, i.e., 2   (2 − 2)  which we have assumed.
Finally, given  and taking into account that  ≥  and  ≥  , a junior worker
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is ready to accept a ST contract with  whenever  + 
³
1 + 1
´
 + (1− ) ≥
(1 + ) , that is, whenever  ≥ 0.
Claim 3: e ( 0 ) ≥ e ( 0 ) for any  ≥  and for any  ≤ .
Proof of Claim 3: Given the definition of  in Claim 2, e ( 0 ) ≥ e ( 0 )
for any  ≥  . Then, the claim follows after Lemma 1 (b).
Claim 4: e ( 0 ) ≥ max©e ( 0  )  e ()ª for any  ≤ .
Proof of Claim 4: The first inequality follows after Claim 3, if we also take into account
that    implies    . The second inequality follows the definition of  and
Lemma 1 (a).
Claim 5: e () ≥ max©e ( 0  )  e ( 0 )ª for any  ∈ ( ).
Proof of Claim 5: We first prove that we can apply Lemma 1 (c) because   22
Given that    , the previous inequality holds if
³
1 + 1
´
 ≥ 22 1 (1 + ) , that is,
( + 1) 2 ≥  (1 + ) e2, which is always satisfied. Then, the first part of the inequality
follows after the characterisation of  in part (vi) of the theorem and Lemma 1 (c).
The second part follows the definition of  and Lemma 1 (a).
Claim 6: e ( 0  ) ≥ max©e ()  e ( 0 )ª for any  ≥ .
Proof of Claim 6: By the same argument as in Claim 5, the maximum of the two terms
inside the maximization is e (). Then, the inequality is implied by the characteri-
sation of  in part (vi) of the theorem, by the property that    and Lemma 1
(c).
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) In the discussion that precedes Proposition 4, we have
shown that the equilibrium in Theorem 1 is preferred by the firms to that in Proposition
1. We now prove that this is also the case for the workers.
First, in Claim 2 in the proof of Theorem 1, we computed the value  such that
e () = e ( 0 ) and we showed that  + (1 − ) =  +  , that
is,  =
³
1 + 1
´
 . Given that    because   , a suﬃcient condition for
part (i) is that the workers are not worse-oﬀ in the equilibrium including ST contracts if
we substitute  by  . Second, note that 2
p
2 ≤ 2
p
2 because the inequality is
equivalent to e2 ³1 + 1´ ≤ 2 1 (1 + ), that is, (2 + (1− )2) ( + 1) ≤ 2(1 + )
or, 2 ≤
³
1 + 1
´
2 Third, the expected utility of a worker under a LT contract when
  2
p
2 is (after easy computations)  () = 1
8
e22 whereas the expected utility
of a high-ability agent under a ST contract when   2
p
2 is  () = 1822.
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It follows that the derivatives of the utilities satisfy  0 ()   0() that is, the rent
increases (with ) faster under ST contracts (with a high-ability worker) than under LT
contracts. Fourth, from  + (1− ) =  +  it follows that if there were no extra
rents at any contract, then the total expected utility by workers would be the same in
both equilibria. Given the second and third remarks, if there are extra rents, they involve
a larger set of firms and they are higher for each  under ST than under LT contracts.
Therefore, the set of workers is also better-oﬀ in the equilibrium found in Theorem 1 than
in that in Proposition 1.
(ii) By arguments similar to those before, shrinking the set of firms and workers
that sign ST contracts in equilibrium cannot be beneficial: everyone involved would lose.
On the other hand, a marginal expansion of the set of firms that use ST contracts in
equilibrium improves eﬃciency. To show this property, consider that firms in the intervals
(  + ] and [ − ) (where  and  are small and such that the proportion of
firms in the intervals is the same as the rate of low- versus high-ability seniors) switch to
ST contracts. Given that e ()− e ( 0 ) = 0 for  = , and the continuity
of both profit functions in , each firm in (  + ] looses an amount “approximately”
equal to ∆() (−), where ∆() ≡ ( ()− (0)) and the derivative is
evaluated at  = . Also, the density of firms with a project of value  is (), where
() is the density function of () Therefore, the total loss in profits for this set of
firms is on the order of ∆()()2. Similarly, the total loss in profits for the firms in
[ − ) is proportional to ()2. Concerning the workers, the expected utility
of a worker who is now hired under a ST contracts instead of a LT contract increases by
a constant, following the arguments developed in part (i). Hence, the total utility gain
by the workers in proportional to (()+ ()). Given that we do the analysis for
a fixed  , those firms and workers are the only ones aﬀected by the change. Therefore,
for small  and , the sum of profits and utility increases after the firms in the intervals
(  + ] and [ − ) switch from LT to ST contracts.
Proof of Theorem 2. Given that the behavior of the workers is optimal by con-
struction, we prove the theorem if we show that firms’ strategies are optimal. We do it
through a series of claims.
Claim 1: b ≤  − 12 b2 (2 − 2) 
Proof of Claim 1. Given that  ≥ b and  ≥  , (1 + ) −  ( + (1− )) ≤
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− 1
2
 b2 (2 − 2) Moreover 0 ≤ − 12 b2 (2 − 2) because this inequality is equiv-
alent to b ≤ 1(2−2)√2 = .
Claim 2: b ≤ 1q2b and b ≤ 1√2
Proof of Claim 2: We assume that b such that e ³ b b  ´ = e ³ b b  b´
satisfies that b lies in regions  () and  ³b´ and we will prove that this is
indeed the case. If b lies in these regions, then b =  + 12 b2 (2 − 2)  Therefore,b ≤ 1q2b = 1q2 + b2 (2 − 2) if and only if b ≤ 1√2 which is implied by
the fact that b ≤  and, under assumption 2  ³1 + 1´ 2,  ≤ 1√2 (by Claim
1 in the proof of Theorem 1).
Claim 3: 
³ b b  b´ =  ³ b b  ´ ≥  ³ b´ 
Proof of Claim 3. The first equality corresponds to the definition of b  To prove the
inequality, we notice that b ≤ 1p2 because b ≤  and  ≤ 1p2 (by Claim 1 in
the proof of Theorem 1). Given that b ≤ 1p2 and b ≤ 1√2 the inequality can be
written as −1 b + 12 ³ b´2 ≥ −1 + 12 ³e b´2  By Claim 1, a suﬃcient condition is
−1
³
 − 1
2
 b2 (2 − 2)´+ 12 ³ b´2 ≥ −1+ 12 ³e b´2  that is,  (2 − 2)+2 ≥ e2,
which holds with equality.
Claim 4: e ¡ b  ¢  maxne ³ b  b´  e ()o  for any   b
Proof of Claim 4: It follows from Claim 3 and Lemma 1 (a) and (b).
Claim 5: e ³ b  b´ ≥ max©e ¡ b ¢  e ()ª  for any  ≥ b
Proof of Claim 5: e ³ b  b´ ≥ e ¡ b ¢ for any  ≥ b because of Claim
3 and Lemma 1 (b). The inequality e ³  b´ ≥ e () for any  ≥ b also
follows from Claim 3 and Lemma 1 (c) provided either b  22 or 2  2e2. We
notice that b is certainly higher than 22 if b is lower than but closer to . Indeed, ifb =  then, following the same steps as in Claim 2 in the proof of Theorem 1 we obtainb =  = ³1 + 1´ , higher than 22 if and only if 2  (1 + )e2, which always
holds.
Proof of Theorem 3. We recall that is characterised bye () = e ( 0 ).
If   , then    for all  ∈ £¤. Therefore, Lemma 1 (b) implies e () 
e ( 0 ) for all  ∈ £¤. It easily follows that e ()  e (  ) for
all  ∈ £¤,  ≥ 0 and  ≥  . Therefore, in equilibrium, no ST contract can be
signed, since it would imply that some firms choose the strategy of keeping low-ability
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senior workers, which is dominated by the strategy of always oﬀering LT contracts.
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